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Choosing Low-Cost Institutions 
In Global Governance  
 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Benjamin Faude  
 
Abstract 
Contemporary global governance takes place not only through formal inter-governmental 
organizations and treaties, but increasingly through diverse institutional forms including 
informal inter-governmental organizations, trans-governmental networks and transnational 
public-private partnerships. While these forms differ in many ways, they are all what we call 
“low-cost institutions” (LCIs): the costs of creating, operating, changing and exiting them, 
and the sovereignty costs they impose, are substantially lower on average than those of treaty-
based institutions. LCIs also provide substantive and political governance benefits based on 
their low costs, including reduced risk, malleability and flexibility, as well as many of the 
general cooperation benefits provided by all types of institutions. LCIs are poorly-suited for 
creating and enforcing binding commitments, but can perform many other governance 
functions, alone and as complements to treaty-based institutions. We argue that the 
availability of LCIs changes the cost-benefit logic of institutional choice in a densely 
institutionalized international system, making the creation of new institutions, which existing 
research sees as the “last resort,” more likely. In addition, LCIs empower executive, 
bureaucratic and societal actors, incentivizing those actors to favor creating LCIs rather than 
treaty-based institutions. The availability of LCIs affects global governance in multiple ways.  
It reduces the status quo bias of governance, changes its institutional and actor composition, 
enables (modest) cooperation in times of polarization and gridlock, creates beneficial 
institutional divisions of labor, and expands governance options. At the same time, the 
proliferation of LCIs reduces the focality of incumbent institutions, increasing the complexity 
of governance. 
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I. Introduction 
• Why did states establish the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in 1999, when numerous 
inter-governmental institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, were available 
to promote financial stability?1 
• Why did states create the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 instead of 
modifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, even though doing 
so left them without authority to interdict high-seas shipments of weapons of mass 
destruction?2 
• Why did states form the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989 to combat 
money laundering, despite the availability of capable institutions including the IMF, 
OECD and regional security organizations?3  
• Why did the World Bank, with member state approval, partner with private sector 
participants in the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) in 1999 to support market-based 
climate change mitigation mechanisms, instead of acting through the Bank itself or the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?4  
In all these cases, states chose to address emerging cooperation problems not by assigning 
them to incumbent formal intergovernmental organizations or multilateral treaties, but by 
creating new institutions of different types, including informal intergovernmental 
organizations (PSI and FATF), a trans-governmental network (FSF), and a transnational 
public-private partnership (PCF).  
These examples are by no means anomalous. Over the past three decades, the number of 
informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) rose from 27 to 72, a 167% increase;5 
transnational public-private partnerships (TPPPs) increased from 26 to 167, a 542% increase;6 
and trans-governmental networks (TGNs) expanded from 25 to 141, a 464% increase.7 At the 
same time, the adoption of multilateral treaties has stagnated: while some 35 treaties were 
 
1  Clarke 2014 
2  Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009 
3 Hameiri, Jones and Sandor 2018 
4  Freestone 2013 
5 Vabulas and Snidal 2013 
6  Westerwinter 2016:2 
7  Abbott et al. 2018:10 
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deposited with the UN in each decade between 1950 and 2000, only 20 were deposited 
between 2000 and 2010, and none between 2011 and 2013.8  
To understand how these changes in institutional composition may affect global governance, 
it is essential to elucidate their causes, and to assess their consequences and likely future 
development. To do so requires analyzing the institutional choices that states make when 
confronted with emerging cooperation problems. 9 To facilitate such an analysis, we develop 
an actor-centered approach to institutional choice in an international system that is densely 
institutionalized, and is populated not only by formal interstate institutions, but also by 
diverse informal institutions including IIGOs, TGNs and TPPPs. Our approach conceptualizes 
states as boundedly rational actors making conscious institutional choices.10 More precisely, 
we assume that states seek to address cooperation problems effectively, but are also sensitive 
to the costs and risks of cooperation. That is, they seek to balance costs and risks, within the 
limits of their ability, against the substantive and political governance benefits of particular 
institutional forms.  
We treat IIGOs, TGNs and TPPPs as important members of a common and distinct class of 
transnational institutions we call “low-cost institutions” (LCIs). Much of the literature 
independently analyzes IIGOs, TGNs, TPPPs and other institutional forms,11 using distinct 
explanatory factors.12 In our view, however, it is analytically fruitful to treat these seemingly 
diverse institutional forms as a common class, because doing so allows us to explain why 
states choose such forms – in preference to treaty-based institutions – using a single set of 
explanatory factors. This increases generalizability, theoretical parsimony and analytical 
leverage compared to existing approaches. It is appropriate to treat all three as members of a 
common class because they share features that are highly relevant to states’ institutional 
choices. 
In substance, our approach leads us to argue that state decisions to address emerging 
cooperation problems through LCIs instead of incumbent treaty-based institutions are based 
on four common rationales, which reflect common institutional features.  
 
8  Pauwelyn et al. 2014: 734-735 
9 Emerging cooperation problems might be wholly new, problems that have changed significantly, or newly 
salient problems (JMS 2013:23). The emergence of such problems can be recognized from public statements and 
actions of relevant governance actors. 
10 This actor-centered approach complements the organizational ecology explanation for the expansion of new 
institutional forms (Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016), which considers institutions in the aggregate, as 
populations, and focuses on structural features, especially institutional density. 
11 Vabulas & Snidal 2013; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009; Westerwinter 2019. 
12 Separate treatment is, of course, appropriate in analyzing form-specific issues.  
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• First, the costs of creating, operating and changing LCIs, as well as their sovereignty 
and exit costs, are all, on average, substantially lower than those of treaty-based 
institutions. All of these low costs derive primarily from LCIs’ informality: their 
reliance on non-legally binding obligations and relatively uncomplicated operating 
procedures.  
• Second, LCIs provide specific governance benefits – not equally available through 
treaty-based institutions – that derive directly from their low costs. These include 
malleability, flexibility and reduced risk, as well as relaxed constraints on state action, 
widely desired by states. Participation by executive, bureaucratic and societal actors 
(in IIGOs, TGNs and TPPPs respectively) contributes governance competencies and 
enhances LCIs’ ability to target and engage infra- and non-state actors. 
• Third, LCIs offer many of the general governance benefits provided by treaty-based 
institutions, although sometimes in attenuated form. For example, LCIs can reduce the 
transaction costs of cooperation, mitigate asymmetric information, enable working 
relationships among officials, and establish relatively stable behavioral expectations.13  
• Fourth, LCIs empower their infra-state and non-state participants: IIGOs empower 
executive officials (e.g., vis-à-vis legislatures), TGNs bureaucratic actors, and TPPPs 
societal actors. This incentivizes those actors to favor the creation of LCIs (of the 
appropriate type) when they pursue transnational cooperation.   
Taken together, these four factors – low costs, specific and general governance benefits, and 
empowerment – explain why states create LCIs to address cooperation problems rather than 
assigning those problems to incumbent treaty-based institutions, and thus why LCIs have 
proliferated. As we elaborate below, these factors encompass both substantive and political 
considerations: low creation, operating and change costs, governance benefits and 
participation on the substantive side; low sovereignty and exit costs, relaxed constraints and 
empowerment on the political side. 
In comparative terms, our analysis of institutional costs and benefits suggests that treaty-based 
institutions are better-suited than LCIs to create credible state commitments. But LCIs can 
provide adequate or superior responses to many other cooperation problems (substantive fit). 
These include coordination problems and other dilemmas of common aversions, as well as 
problems characterized by uncertainty and dynamism. LCIs can thus complement treaty-based 
institutions by addressing different aspects of complex cooperation problems. In addition, 
 
13  See Keohane 1984 
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LCIs’ low sovereignty and exit costs allow states to reduce the costs and risks of cooperation 
(political fit). Finally, empowering infra- and non-state actors facilitates engaging targets and 
stakeholders, while creating new advocates for LCIs (empowerment).  
Our analysis builds on the most general actor-centered theory of institutional choice in a 
densely institutionalized international system, developed by Jupille, Mattli and Snidal 
(JMS).14 JMS presents an integrated analysis of states’ institutional choice options in densely 
institutionalized settings, while synthesizing a range of scholarship on choice options.15 In the 
JMS logic, states assign emerging cooperation problems to incumbent treaty-based 
institutions so long as they are expected to produce governance outcomes “above some 
minimum threshold.”16 For JMS, such status quo choices reduce costs, uncertainty and risk 
compared to changing incumbent institutions and, especially, to creating new institutions to 
replace them, the most costly, risky and uncertain option. JMS therefore expects that new 
institutions will be created only rarely, producing a “strong status quo bias” in global 
governance.17  
Importantly, however, JMS and the scholarship it synthesizes focus exclusively on 
institutional choice among treaty-based institutions. We expand that logic by considering how 
states choose when a broader menu of institutional options is available to them. This allows us 
to explain why states regularly opt for what JMS considers the most costly, risky and 
uncertain choice, the creation of new institutions – albeit low-cost institutions. More broadly, 
our approach calls into question JMS’ general conclusion that global governance as a whole is 
characterized by a strong institutional status quo bias. In contrast, we explain how the 
availability of LCIs helps to overcome status quo bias, gridlock and stagnation.18 
In sum, our approach adds value to scholarship on institutional choice in a densely 
institutionalized international system – and thus on contemporary global governance – in four 
major ways:  
• It analyzes how states make institutional choice decisions when a range of institutional 
forms – not simply treaty-based institutions – is available to them; this analysis better 
explains the proliferation of diverse institutional forms. 
 
14 Jupille, Mattli and Snidal 2013 
15 E.g. Aggarwal 1998; Alter and Meunier 2009; Busch 2007; Helfer 2009; van de Graaf 2013 
16 JMS 2013:7 
17  JMS 2013:35 
18  Hale et al. 2013; Pauwelyn et al. 2014 
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• It enhances theoretical parsimony and analytical leverage by encompassing multiple 
institutional forms within a single analytical category – LCIs – and explaining the 
choice of those institutions with a single set of explanatory factors, rather than 
analyzing the benefits and limitations of each form individually. 
• Its actor-centered perspective complements structural approaches such as 
organizational ecology, providing fuller and more nuanced explanations. 
• It more accurately characterizes the implications of institutional choice decisions for 
global governance, highlighting that LCIs can help to overcome status quo bias, 
provide a wider range of institutional options, and complement treaty-based 
institutions in addressing complex governance problems, while remaining less able to 
address credible commitment problems and reducing the focality of incumbent treaty-
based institutions, thus increasing the complexity of global governance. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces LCIs. It identifies 
their common institutional features; explains how these give rise to low costs, specific and 
general governance benefits, and governance limitations; and presents the three types of LCIs 
we consider here. Section III describes the JMS logic of institutional choice. Section IV 
modifies that logic by introducing the availability of LCIs, first in a context of unitary states, 
as in JMS, and then in a context that incorporates bureaucratic and societal proponents of 
cooperation. We illustrate our argument with diverse examples. To facilitate further empirical 
investigations, we derive theoretical conjectures that can be operationalized as testable 
propositions, in terms appropriate to the particular research question and issue area. Section V 
summarizes the implications of our analysis for global governance.  
 
II. Introducing Low-Cost Institutions  
 A. Defining LCIs 
LCIs are institutions: “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that 
prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”19 While some 
institutions - such as customary international law - are only implicit, LCIs, like treaty-based 
institutions, are “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, 
 
19  Keohane 1988:383 
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proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.”20 Most LCIs are also organizations: “institutions 
capable of exercising agency.”21 
We focus here on IIGOs, TGNs and TPPPs. These are particularly widespread and 
consequential institutional forms in contemporary transnational governance; in addition, each 
has clear common features and a well-developed literature. Yet these institutions do not 
exhaust the category of LCIs. Many “private transnational regulatory organizations” satisfy 
our definition and are significant governance actors.22 The same is true of transnational 
cooperative arrangements formed by subnational governments.23 Sub-types could be 
identified within our three categories. And new low-cost forms may emerge and thrive. 
However, our focus on IIGOs, TGNs and TPPPs enables us to frame our analysis wholly in 
terms of institutional choices by state actors, not non-state or sub-state actors, and thus to 
maintain analytic comparability with JMS.  
LCIs have two characteristic institutional features. First, they are relatively informal, 
compared to treaty-based institutions. We define informality in terms of two major traits.  
• LCIs are created by non-binding agreements or understandings, not by legally-binding 
treaties among states; by implication, they also have authority to adopt only non-
binding standards, not legally-binding rules. In contrast to the concept of “soft law,”24 
which refers primarily to norms as outputs of international cooperation,25 the LCI 
concept also encompasses organizational features including participants and 
procedures.  
• LCIs feature decision-making formalities and operating procedures that are less 
elaborate and complicated than those of treaty-based institutions.  
Our definition of informality differs from many in the literature on informal institutions. First, 
while we focus on “explicit arrangements,” a significant part of that literature emphasizes 
unwritten norms, ideologies and aspects of culture.26 Such institutions are not the result of 
conscious design choices, but emerge spontaneously from actor behavior; as a result, they are 
 
20 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001:762 
21 Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016:256 
22  Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016. These institutions have also proliferated. In climate change, for example, 
they “barely existed” in 1990, but at least 31 operate today. Id. at 253, 248. 
23 Betsill and Bulkeley 2006 
24 Abbott and Snidal 2000 
25 Abbott and Snidal’s conception of soft law does, however, include “delegation” of norm-related functions to 
organizations. 
26 For a domestic example, see Kaufmann, Hooghiemstra and Feeney 2018. 
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not captured by our theoretical approach, which focuses on conscious decisions by 
governance actors.    
Second, most definitions of informality that do focus on conscious institutional choices are 
tailored for particular types of inter-state institutions. Accordingly, they highlight highly 
institution-specific features. Vabulas & Snidal, to take a prominent example, define IIGOs as 
inter-state organizations based on explicit shared expectations, with regular meetings but no 
independent secretariats or headquarters.27 Lipson, in contrast, defines informal inter-state 
agreements as those lacking states’ “most authoritative imprimatur, … treaty ratification,” 
those made at lower levels of government, and those expressed in “less formal” written or oral 
form.28 We adopt a more general definition applicable to a wide range of informal 
transnational institutions.  
The second characteristic feature of LCIs is participation by executive, bureaucratic and 
societal actors, rather than or in addition to states. Such participation strengthens LCIs by 
incorporating additional actor competencies; it also empowers participating actors by 
providing them direct roles in decision-making. Together, these features constitute LCIs as a 
distinct class of international institutions, in spite of the differences among individual forms.29  
It is plausible to assume that the proliferation of LCIs was enabled by the end of the Cold War 
and the decreasing costs of transnational communications based on new technologies.30 
However, we cannot fully explain this institutional dynamic through structural factors alone. 
Rather, we must analyze why actors make conscious choices to create LCIs under given 
structural conditions. To do so, we translate the characteristic features of LCIs into the 
analytical categories of costs, risks, and governance benefits and limitations, widely applied in 
analyses of institutional choice and other forms of state action.  
B. Costs 
We postulate that LCIs enable transnational cooperation at significantly lower costs than 
treaty-based institutions, on average. Because we are interested in decisions to create 
institutions, formation costs are particularly important. These take two main forms:  
 
27 Vabulas and Snidal 2013; compare Fioretos 2019 
28  Lipson 1991:498 
29 Pauwelyn et al. (2012) refer to all of these features – non-binding normative outputs, loosely organized 
procedures and non-state actor participation – as potentially characterizing the process of “informal international 
lawmaking.” We treat them as constituting a particular institutional form.   
30 Roger and Dauvergne 2016:418; Manulak and Snidal 2020 
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• Transaction costs are the transnational costs of putting in place transnational 
cooperation: the costs of searching for partners, acquiring information, bargaining, 
contracting, and institutionalizing agreed arrangements.31 These are lower for LCIs 
than for treaty-based institutions because LCIs are not created by legally-binding 
treaties and lack authority to adopt legally-binding rules; they can thus be formed with 
fewer inter-state diplomatic formalities and less intensive bargaining than are 
characteristic of treaty negotiations.  
• Domestic approval costs are the costs proponents of cooperation face in persuading 
governments to authorize and engage in particular forms of cooperation. They include 
the costs of obtaining approval from, e.g., senior executive officials, inter-agency 
committees and legislatures,32 and the costs of overcoming resistance from opponents 
of cooperation. LCIs can often avoid procedures such as high-level executive 
clearance and legislative approval, widely required for treaty-based institutions. It may 
also be easier to persuade authorities to act through LCIs, and to overcome opposition 
to them, because of their limited authority.  
Other types of costs arise over time. We assume that states and other actors “discount” these 
future costs and consider them in formation decisions. 
• Operating costs include the salaries and expenses of staff, governing bodies, advisors 
and other personnel, and the costs of headquarters and other offices. Importantly, 
operating costs also include the costs of making and implementing decisions, 
including material expenses, time and political costs. These costs are lower in LCIs 
because of their less elaborate decision-making formalities and their frequently 
smaller material footprints.  
• Change costs arise when participants modify institutional features in response to 
changed conditions or preferences. These are essentially re-formation costs, and so are 
lower in LCIs for the same reasons as formation costs are. Low decision costs also 
facilitate change. 
• Exit costs are the costs that states or other actors must incur to withdraw from an 
institution or its rules. Because institutions enable joint gains through collective action, 
exit costs include foregone cooperation gains. They also include material expenses, 
domestic and international, of organizing and implementing exit. Finally, exit costs 
 
31  JMS 2013:38 n. 44 
32 Lipson 1991 
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include political costs such as weakening an actor’s reputation as a reliable partner. 
While exit from LCIs does forego gains from cooperation, other exit costs are lower 
than in treaty-based institutions because of LCIs’ non-binding character, which gives 
rise to low operating and change costs.  
Finally, sovereignty costs are the “decisional autonomy costs that states face in accepting 
encroachments on their sovereignty.”33 They “range from simple differences in outcome on 
particular issues, to loss of authority over decision-making in an issue-area, to more 
fundamental encroachments on state sovereignty.” Sovereignty costs increase to the degree 
that states “accept external authority over significant decisions,” especially decisions that 
“impinge on the relations between a state and its citizens or territory.”34 Because of their non-
binding character and low exit costs, LCIs entail less “loss of authority” than treaty-based 
institutions.   
Not every LCI has equally low costs. For example, a TPPP with many disparate partners may 
have higher transaction and decision costs than a TGN of a few like-minded officials. 
Likewise, not every treaty-based institution has equally high costs. For example, a multilateral 
treaty may incorporate escape and withdrawal clauses that reduce sovereignty and exit costs.35 
Yet such isolated islands of flexibility rarely produce costs as low as those of LCIs, where low 
costs pervade institutional structures and procedures. Thus, our central point is that the 
average LCI enables transnational cooperation at significantly lower costs than the average 
treaty-based institution.  
C. Governance benefits and risks 
LCIs generate three kinds of governance benefits: specific benefits that stem from their low 
costs; general benefits like those produced by all types of institutions; and benefits derived 
from the participation of executive, bureaucratic or societal actors.  
First, the relatively low costs, on average, of LCIs produce specific governance benefits that 
help states to address governance problems (substantive fit) at acceptable costs and risks 
(political fit).  
• The structures, procedures and rules of LCIs are highly malleable: they can be fine-
tuned at formation to fit specific problem characteristics and contextual features more 
 
33 JMS 2013:25 
34 Abbott & Snidal 2000:436-437 
35 Rosendorff & Milner 2001 
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easily and effectively than those of treaty-based institutions. Malleability derives from 
LCIs’ low formation costs, especially transaction and domestic approval costs; 
avoiding diplomatic and legal formalities provides more diverse and nuanced 
institutional options. Lower operating and decision-making costs also enhance fine-
tuning. 
• Actors can modify the structures, procedures and rules of LCIs over time more easily 
and effectively than those of treaty-based institutions, because of low change costs. 
Flexibility allows LCIs to adapt to new conditions, information, issues, preferences 
and governance demands. It also helps LCIs to engage in experimentalist governance, 
trying different approaches and learning through trial and error.36 
• LCIs’ low formation, change and exit costs reduce the risk that transnational 
negotiations will unfold in unforeseen and harmful ways. Low change costs reduce the 
risk that a new institution will permanently fail to effectively address the problem at 
hand. Low sovereignty and exit costs reduce the risk that an institution will unduly 
limit freedom of action or impinge on state authority. 
• LCIs impose more relaxed constraints on states than do treaty-based institutions, 
reflecting LCIs’ low sovereignty, change and exit costs. As discussed further below, 
relaxed constraints are in some circumstances a serious limitation, reducing LCIs’ 
ability to create and enforce credible commitments (see Section D). Yet states often 
place a high premium on freedom of action, and in those circumstances relaxed 
constraints can facilitate (modest levels of) cooperation.  
Second, because they enable governance actors to interact continuously on the basis of agreed 
principles or (soft) rules, LCIs provide many of the governance benefits associated with 
institutions of all kinds. Thus, LCIs can reduce the transaction costs of sustaining and 
expanding cooperation; build transnational working relationships; mitigate inadequate or 
asymmetric information by producing and disseminating information; construct actor 
reputations and provide fora in which to assess them. These benefits are not premised on 
relationships of harmony; rather, LCIs help reduce discord by establishing shared 
expectations that reduce uncertainty about actor behavior.37   
These benefits are sometimes more limited than in treaty-based institutions. For example, 
LCIs may create less stable behavioral expectations due to their low change and exit costs and 
 
36 Sabel and Zeitlin 2010 
37 See Keohane 1984: Chapter 6 
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limited enforcement power. They may also create lower reputational costs due to relaxed 
constraints and limited institutionalization. Yet other benefits may be stronger than in treaty-
based institutions: for example, LCIs often disseminate information particularly effectively 
and create candid and highly productive working relationships among officials, as in many 
TGNs. 
Third, LCIs empower particular governance actors, both within and outside the state, by 
enabling them to participate directly in global governance: IIGOs empower executive officials 
(vis-à-vis legislatures), TGNs agency officials, and TPPPs private actors. Their participation 
produces additional governance benefits. It allows LCIs to draw on the competencies of 
diverse actors, including the expertise of government agencies, the material resources of 
business and the normative commitment and legitimacy of civil society organizations. It also 
enables LCIs to engage more effectively with infra- and non-state governance targets and 
stakeholders: more knowledgeably framing rules and policies to influence their behavior, and 
more effectively interacting with them to promote implementation. These benefits are 
particularly important for cooperation problems that require regulating non-state actors and 
enlisting them in developing solutions, such as climate change. 
D. Governance limitations  
The same institutional features responsible for LCIs’ low costs and specific governance 
benefits constrain LCIs’ ability to address demanding cooperation problems. In general, LCIs 
are less highly institutionalized than treaty-based institutions, and so cannot offer the same 
centralization of cooperative activities and institutional independence.38 More specifically, 
LCIs cannot adopt legally-binding rules or implement strong monitoring and enforcement. As 
a result, they cannot tackle issues that require highly credible commitments to overcome 
incentives to defect, as in international trade. Put differently, they are unable to induce states 
to behave in ways that diverge significantly from their ideal policies.39 Thus, LCIs are sub-
optimal institutional choices in settings where distributional conflicts are strong, defection 
from cooperative solutions is likely, and noncompliance is difficult to detect.40 
 
  
 
38 Abbott and Snidal 1998 
39 Downs et al. 1996 
40 Abbott & Snidal 2000:45-46 
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E. Types of LCIs  
In this section, we briefly introduce and illustrate the three types of LCIs we consider here, 
showing how each reflects the common features, benefits and limitations of LCIs as a class of 
institutions.  
IIGOs:  
An informal international organization (IIGO) is “an explicitly shared expectation – rather 
than a formalized agreement – about purpose […] with explicitly associated state ‘members’ 
who participate in regular meetings but have no independent secretariat or other significant 
institutionalization such as a headquarters and/or permanent staff.” Examples include the 
G7/8, G20 and other “G-groups,” and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Unlike other 
types of LCIs, IIGOs are “by definition intergovernmental with states as the key participants 
(at the ministerial or executive level).”41  
IIGOs can be formed “more quickly and with lower negotiation costs [than treaty-based 
institutions] because … commitments are less binding and permanent.” Domestic approval 
costs are low, as IIGOs avoid costly procedures required for treaty-based institutions. With no 
secretariat or headquarters, operating costs are also low. Moreover, IIGOs provide substantial 
flexibility in responding to changing circumstances.42 “Less binding and permanent” 
commitments reduce sovereignty and exit costs, and thus uncertainty and risk. In the G20, for 
example, “states are unencumbered by procedures and less concerned that their commitment 
will be strongly binding.” Yet these same features limit IIGOs’ ability to create and enforce 
strongly credible state commitments: the G20’s informality may limit the institution to 
“putting out fires.”43  
TGNs:  
Trans-governmental cooperation involves “direct interactions among sub-units of different 
governments” that “are not controlled by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of 
those governments.”44 The members of trans-governmental networks (TGNs) – such as the 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) – are not states, but “discrete, specialized 
 
41 Vabulas & Snidal 2013:197-198 
42 Vabulas & Snidal 2013:209-211; see also Lipson 1991. 
43 Viola 2015:27, 32 
44 Keohane and Nye 1974:43 
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agencies of governments.”45 This makes TGNs particularly suitable for complex and technical 
policy areas.  
TGNs are formed by voluntary agreements among agencies, not inter-state treaties. This 
minimizes “international diplomatic formalities and domestic approval processes,” including 
“layers of domestic legal review,” reducing formation costs.46 TGNs adopt only non-binding 
decisions – although member agencies can implement these through binding regulations – and 
generally act by consensus, limiting sovereignty and exit costs. Decision costs are low 
because of limited formalities and shared epistemic orientations. Again, however, these 
features limit TGNs’ ability to enforce strong commitments.  
The non-state character of TGN membership may appear inconsistent with our analytical 
focus on state decisions. However, while some TGNs are established by agencies with little 
involvement from states as such, many are “sponsored” by states or treaty-based institutions, 
which direct or encourage their formation.47 The EU, for example, has sponsored or created 
numerous TGNs, including BEREC, to coordinate member state implementation of EU 
rules;48 the World Health Organization (WHO), to take another example, sponsored the Blood 
Regulators Network. We focus on sponsored TGNs, which involve institutional choices by 
states.  
The same analytical logic may apply more broadly. States and interstate institutions regularly 
sponsor institutions other than TGNs. For example, the G8 (an IIGO) sponsored the 
International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (an independent IIGO) to 
facilitate knowledge-sharing.49 In addition, while we focus here on IIGOs, TGNs and TPPPs, 
because they are so well-defined, widespread and consequential, states also orchestrate50 and 
delegate authority to51 other types of LCIs, including private and subnational institutions. We 
encourage future research to extend our analysis of states’ institutional choices to these 
actions, broadening its empirical focus. 
 
 
 
45 Raustiala 2002:3. Some institutions that operate as TGNs, and are treated as such in the literature, are formally 
structured as inter-state bodies. Examples include the PSI and FATF. 
46 Abbott, Kauffmann & Lee 2018 
47 Abbott, Kauffmann & Lee 2018:14 
48 Eberlein and Newman 2008 
49 van de Graaf 2013 
50 Abbott et al. 2015 
51 Green 2018 
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TPPPs:  
Transnational public-private partnerships (TPPPs) are “agreements for collaborative 
governance between public actors (national governmental agencies, subnational governments 
or IOs) and non-state actors (foundations, firms, advocacy organizations, or others) which 
establish common norms, rules, objectives, and decision-making and implementation 
procedures for a set of policy problems.”52 Examples include the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biomaterials; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; and the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association.53  
TPPPs are “based on soft agreements not carrying the force of international law, and are 
structured around decentralized networks with low level of bureaucratization,” producing low 
formation, sovereignty, operating, change and exit costs. TPPPs can be fine-tuned to specific 
conditions, and are highly flexible. They pool “authority, competences, and resources from 
both the public and the private spheres,” helping to engage and influence private actors. 
TPPPs “complement the functions of intergovernmental institutions by creating numerous 
niches for incremental, outcome-oriented collective action…”54 However, like other LCIs, 
they cannot adopt legally-binding rules or implement strong monitoring or enforcement. 
In all of these categories, we focus on free-standing institutions. However, treaty-based 
institutions frequently create internal mechanisms and more or less tightly-linked institutional 
“progeny”55 that are structured and operate much like IIGOs, TGNs or TPPPs. For example, 
the OECD conducts much of its work through committees and working groups of expert 
national officials, like TGNs. The “opening up of international organizations”56 gives private 
actors greater roles in policy formulation and implementation, as in TPPPs. The WHO, for 
example, sponsored the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) as an 
independent TPPP, but houses its secretariat and integrates it into WHO’s own operations.57 
Other internal mechanisms and progeny take distinct, idiosyncratic forms, such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.58 In addition, powerful member states create 
informal bodies and practices within formal international organizations to gain influence over 
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important decisions, as in many IIGOs.59 Here again, future research could extend our 
analysis of institutional choice to such governance arrangements. 
 
III. The JMS model 
The logic of institutional choice developed by Jupille, Mattli and Snidal seeks to explain the 
collective institutional choices that states make in a densely institutionalized environment to 
address emerging cooperation problems. Dense institutionalization means that states rarely 
make these decisions on a clean slate, but “in the context of an already institutionalized status 
quo with a focal institution that is the default institutional alternative,” such as the World 
Health Organization in global health. In this context, state decisions result from “interactions 
between cooperation problems and the institutional status quo.”60  
JMS posits four distinct choice strategies available to states: USE (address the problem 
through the default focal institution in the issue area), SELECT (choose one out of two or 
more incumbent institutions), CHANGE (modify an incumbent institution), and CREATE 
(form a new institution to replace an existing one). JMS argues that states consider these 
choices in sequence, as represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For JMS, USE of an incumbent focal institution is the choice with the lowest costs, 
uncertainty61 and risk, as states are familiar with the institution’s capabilities. SELECT is only 
modestly more costly and uncertain, as all incumbent institutions are familiar and appear 
potentially suitable for addressing the problem.  
 
59 Kleine 2013; Stone 2011 
60 JMS 2013:9, 19 
61 For JMS, “uncertainty” captures uncertainty about the state of the world and the impact of institutional 
choices.   
Figure 1. JMS Choice Sequence 
       
USE   SELECT                CHANGE    CREATE 
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CHANGE is substantially costlier and riskier – and thus is shown farther to the right in Figure 
1. Here states must modify the structure, mandate, authority or other features of an incumbent 
institution so that it can address the problem at hand. CHANGE is costly in part because of 
the transaction costs of negotiating and implementing institutional modifications, but even 
more because of uncertainty concerning the outcome of negotiations, the changed institution’s 
effectiveness and the sovereignty costs it may create.  
A decision to CREATE a new institution is substantially costlier and more uncertain than 
CHANGE, and is shown even further to the right. Transaction costs, uncertainty and risk are 
all higher than with CHANGE, where many features of the current institution remain intact. 
For JMS, importantly, CREATE means that a new institution completely replaces the 
incumbent one (JMS 2013:10), so all of its benefits and costs are uncertain. 
In the JMS model, unitary states make institutional choices rationally and strategically to 
advance their joint interests. However, JMS does not assume that states possess the “synoptic” 
rationality of classic rational choice theory. Rather, it adopts the “more realistic and fruitful” 
assumption that states are boundedly rational: it is costly for them to gather information and 
make decisions, because of the complexity of the world and their own cognitive limitations.62 
Boundedly rational states cannot compare the costs and benefits of all available options, and 
thus cannot make optimal choices. Rather, they act as “satisficers,” economizing on 
information by accepting solutions that are “good enough” States will consider institutional 
choices that involve greater costs, risks and uncertainty only when they see the status quo as 
“clearly inadequate”63 – in Herbert Simon’s words, when it falls below their “aspiration 
level.”64  
States will therefore adopt the lowest-cost, lowest risk option USE – even where superior 
institutions are available – unless they conclude that the performance of the incumbent 
institution will be clearly deficient. JMS does not theorize satisfactory performance; it simply 
assumes that “satisficing” states will stick with the incumbent institution so long as it meets 
some “minimum threshold requirement.”65  
If the incumbent institution does not meet this threshold, states will move away from the 
institutional status quo in incremental steps. They will next consider SELECTING another 
incumbent institution. Only if none appears satisfactory will states consider incurring the 
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additional costs and risks of CHANGE. And only as a last resort will they consider the most 
costly and risky decision to CREATE a new replacement institution – “typically after 
systemic breakdown or in the face of a major crisis.”66  
The JMS approach makes important contributions, but its theoretical claims have limited 
scope, because it theorizes state choices wholly in terms of treaty-based institutions.67 To be 
sure, JMS claims to “consider public-private or private governance schemes,” and empirically 
analyzes private accounting governance.68 However, while JMS identifies some benefits of 
particular private institutions, it does not integrate these into its theoretical model. Rather, its 
theoretical claims focus exclusively on treaty-based institutions designed to make and enforce 
credible commitments, especially in international trade. These are crucial functions, but 
global governance also involves additional functions for which LCIs are better suited.  
In spite of these limitations, JMS draws general conclusions for global governance, especially 
concerning its institutional status quo bias.69 Implicitly, JMS assumes that all institutions 
perform the same functions, and present the same benefits, costs and risks. To understand 
recent changes in the institutional makeup of global governance requires a logic of 
institutional choice that encompasses a wider range of institutional options.  
 
IV. Modifying the logic of institutional choice  
In this section we theorize how the logic of institutional choice changes if LCIs as well as 
treaty-based institutions are available to states choosing how to respond to newly emerging 
cooperation problems.  
A. Bounded rationality 
In the JMS model, boundedly rational states seldom even consider options other than USE; 
CREATING a new institution is a very rare event. We adopt the bounded rationality 
assumption, as it makes our analysis more challenging: if states are boundedly rational, how 
can they have established so many LCIs?  
Even in the JMS model, states must assess the likely effectiveness of an incumbent institution 
against their threshold of acceptability; they must make even more complicated comparisons 
if they move further down the choice sequence. Comparing another familiar institutional 
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alternative demands few additional cognitive resources. To be sure, LCIs were initially 
unfamiliar, but over time they have become increasingly familiar to governance actors, who 
can observe the operation of numerous IIGOs, TGNs and TPPPs, some of them very high-
profile, and may well participate in some of them. Thus, the low costs, governance benefits 
and limitations of LCIs have become increasingly well-known, making them salient 
institutional options offering easily-compared packages of benefits, costs and risks. To be 
sure, a new example of a familiar form is more uncertain than a familiar example of a familiar 
form (an incumbent institution). Yet normalization of LCIs steadily narrows the gap.  
In addition, states’ threshold of acceptable performance is not immutable, but dynamic. What 
states perceive as acceptable is “adjusted from time to time in response to new information 
about the environment.”70 As states observe the performance of LCIs, and frequently 
participate in them, states gain greater appreciation for their costs and risks, governance 
benefits and limitations. As states come to recognize the governance outcomes LCIs can 
produce (in appropriate situations) at relatively low cost and risk, alone or together with 
treaty-based institutions, they may modify their aspiration levels accordingly. 
At the same time, the current gridlock in treaty-based institutions71 and polarization in inter-
state relations makes treaty-based institutions less able to meet states’ threshold of acceptable 
performance. These conditions likewise make changing incumbent institutions to fit emerging 
cooperation problems more difficult. Significant change usually requires unanimous 
decisions, which are difficult to achieve given multiple veto players and high transaction 
costs, especially in periods of polarization.72 Moreover, treaty-based institutions usually 
contain few mechanisms for “orderly gradual change.”73 As a result, they are often unable to 
respond effectively to new governance demands, making creation of LCIs increasingly 
attractive.  
More fundamentally, JMS’ view of the constraints imposed by bounded rationality is 
challenged by empirical observations that states frequently do abandon the institutional status 
quo, creating new institutions in pursuit of superior outcomes. The literatures on soft law and 
informal institutions, among others, emphasize that states seek institutional opportunities to 
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achieve their goals more effectively, at lower costs and with fewer institutional constraints.74 
For instance, states concerned with chemical and biological weapons proliferation created the 
Australia Group (an IIGO), in which technical experts could coordinate national export 
controls (as in a TGN) – even though the chemical and biological weapons treaties remained 
in force and the treaty-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons had been 
created. The Group provided greater flexibility, lower transaction costs and fewer constraints, 
and facilitated interactions among governmental experts.75  
The literature on “cross-institutional political strategies” further demonstrates that states 
abandon the institutional status quo with some regularity.76 States engage in forum-shopping 
and regime shifting, moving issues to institutions likely to produce more favorable 
outcomes.77 States create strategic inconsistency, developing new rules in one forum to 
undercut existing rules in another.78 And they engage in competitive regime creation, 
establishing new institutions to challenge existing ones.79 While not all these strategies 
involve institutional creation, they demonstrate states’ willingness and ability to consider and 
implement multiple institutional options.  
B. Modifying the logic of choice  
Like JMS, we assume that states make collective institutional choices on a rational, strategic 
basis, within the limits of bounded rationality. States compare the anticipated benefits, costs 
and risks of incumbent institutions with those of other available choice options, to the extent 
of their ability. In doing so, states seek to address the governance problem at hand 
(substantive fit), but at acceptable levels of cost and risk, including potential sovereignty costs 
(political fit). Boundedly rational states are attuned to such costs because of budget 
constraints, risk aversion in situations of uncertainty, distributive concerns, and often the 
demands of domestic constituents.80 Thus, states seek an easily identified “package” of 
benefits and costs that best meets their needs. 
In sub-section (1), we treat states as unitary actors. We utilize this simplified framework 
heuristically to facilitate consideration of the effects of low institutional costs. In sub-section 
(2), we relax the unitary state assumption, expanding the lens to include infra- and non-state 
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political actors. We focus on the proponents of transnational cooperation, who attempt to 
persuade states to engage in cooperation in particular substantive and institutional ways. 
1. Unitary states  
How does the availability of LCIs change the institutional choice calculus of states? We 
suggest that it can modify state choice decisions at three different points in the JMS choice 
sequence, as shown in Figure 2. Each of these modifications makes decisions to CREATE 
LCIs more likely. We emphasize the first point, as similar considerations apply in the other 
two. 
 
^     USE SELECT  ^ CHANGE ^  CREATE 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Situation (1) 
We begin with situation 1 on the left side of Figure 2. A decision to CREATE a new LCI may 
simply be a better fit for the situation states face – substantively and/or politically – than any 
institutional alternative. Where an LCI is the first-best choice, states need not even consider 
USING, SELECTING or CHANGING an incumbent treaty-based institution.  
a. Substantive fit  
First, an LCI may be a better substantive fit for the cooperation problem at hand. As discussed 
above, the inability of LCIs to create and enforce credible commitments limits their 
usefulness in addressing dilemmas of common interests: cooperation problems in which 
actors try to ensure particular outcomes, as in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. However, the general 
and specific governance benefits of LCIs make them appropriate for addressing dilemmas of 
(3) Less 
costly to 
create LCI  
(2) LCI less 
costly form of 
change 
(1) LCI 
better fit 
for problem  
Figure 2. Modified Choice Sequence 
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common aversions: cooperation problems in which actors seek to avoid particular outcomes.81 
These include pure coordination problems, in which actors seek to align their actions, and 
“Battle of the Sexes” problems, in which actors have different preferences over how to align. 
LCIs may even help to address dilemmas of common interests where the incentives to defect 
are relatively weak or reputational costs weigh heavily. 
LCIs provide governance benefits throughout the policy cycle. They reduce the transaction 
costs of cooperative interactions, facilitate communication, enable working relationships and 
trust-building among officials, and produce and disseminate information. By making and 
implementing “soft law,” they provide focal points and stabilize behavioral expectations. 
They support norm implementation by helping to construct actor reputations and enabling 
others to assess them. The decision to coordinate global financial reforms through the G20 
reflects all of these considerations.82  
LCIs’ specific governance benefits make them particularly suitable for addressing dynamic 
cooperation problems, where governance arrangements must be frequently adjusted, and 
cooperation problems characterized by high levels of uncertainty. Such problems arise in 
issue areas from low to high politics, even in security, as reflected in the creation of LCIs 
including the Australia Group, PSI and the Missile Technology Control Regime. While 
security treaties can establish “credible commitments to … clearly defined long-term goals 
among fixed sets of actors,” LCIs are superior when “security goals are …short term and 
coalitions are constantly changing” and when “political and technological change … makes it 
difficult for states to foresee the consequences of formal, legalized agreements.”83 Similarly, 
LCIs are well-suited to provide nuanced governance interventions, finely-tuned to problem 
characteristics and contexts. Their malleability also increases political fit: by offering more 
diverse and nuanced approaches, LCIs help proponents gain consensual support.  
LCIs are also well-suited to problems best addressed by engaging or influencing executive, 
bureaucratic or societal actors. For example, GOARN and the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) 
were established as TPPPs to coordinate actions by quasi-public and private actors as well as 
states and interstate bodies. And BEREC was created as a TGN to coordinate implementation 
of EU rules by national regulators. 
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As these examples demonstrate, the very features that make LCIs relatively weak in terms of 
binding commitments are advantageous in addressing other types of cooperation problems. 
For example, non-binding norms are beneficial where actors do not know which policies or 
norms are most appropriate, as they facilitate experimentation and trial-by-error approaches. 
LCIs’ ability to disseminate information and to enhance communication facilitates learning 
from these approaches. Thus, PCF was intended to trial and demonstrate how carbon emission 
reduction projects could be structured to contribute to host countries’ sustainable 
development.84  
In many of these situations, moreover, while LCIs have low costs, incumbent treaty-based 
institutions can be expected to have unusually high costs, as they must implement new and 
unfamiliar modes of governance. In effect, the real choice is CHANGE, a costlier option.   
In sum, the substantive fit of LCIs, like that of treaty-based institutions, varies across 
cooperation problems. States making institutional choices must balance the costs, governance 
benefits and limitations of different institutional forms for the specific problems they seek to 
address. Where binding rules, monitoring and enforcement are essential, treaty-based 
institutions will be the first-best choice, LCIs a distant second-best. In other settings, however, 
the low costs of LCIs and their general and specific governance benefits may well make them 
the best institutional choice.  
Two theoretical conjectures follow from this analytical reasoning: 
First, if an emerging cooperation problem is characterized by strong incentives to 
defect from agreed rules, we should observe states choosing a treaty-based institution 
to address it. 
Second, if an emerging cooperation problem is characterized by only weak incentives 
to defect from agreed rules, we should observe states creating or sponsoring an LCI. 
To this point we have considered LCIs as free-standing alternatives to treaty-based 
institutions. Yet neither treaty-based institutions nor LCIs need act alone. In a densely 
institutionalized system, states often create LCIs to complement incumbent treaty-based 
institutions, not to replace them, as JMS assumes. Consider some examples already identified.  
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• States concerned with weapons proliferation created the Australia Group to facilitate 
technical interactions among national experts, complementing legally-binding 
chemical and biological weapons regimes.85  
• States concerned with money laundering created the Financial Action Task Force to 
transform how national bureaucracies regulate domestic as well as transnational 
financial transactions, complementing international finance and security institutions.86  
• The G7 states created the Financial Stability Forum (now Financial Stability Board 
[FSB]) to facilitate frank, wide-ranging interactions among senior policymakers, 
complementing incumbent international financial institutions.87  
• The World Bank created the PCF to generate learning that would strengthen interstate 
negotiations under the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol and help the Bank collaborate with 
private sources of finance.88  
States also use LCIs to bypass procedural bottlenecks in incumbent treaty-based institutions. 
The G20, for example, was created to manage financial reform without the “layers of rules 
and procedures” in the IMF that made “quick, flexible and innovative policies difficult to 
achieve.89 And the European Competition Network bypassed the “administrative bottlenecks” 
of centralized European Commission decisions on all cartel cases.90 States can also select 
particular issues and shift them to a new LCI, established with low formation costs, to handle 
those issues with lower operating costs.91 This might be advantageous, for example, where 
states anticipate frequent tinkering with technical rules, and streamlining the incumbent 
institution is not possible or too costly. Here again, the LCI is complementary, creating a 
mutually reinforcing division of labor.92 Historical institutionalists describe such processes as 
“layering.”93  
This reasoning leads us to the following theoretical conjecture: 
We should observe states creating LCIs tasked to take narrowly-defined decisions or 
actions following failure by those states to take similar decisions or actions within 
incumbent treaty-based institutions. 
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Combining diverse institutions through layering will often produce the best overall 
governance outcomes, especially for multi-faceted problems. Incumbent treaty-based 
institutions can handle challenging problems such as establishing and enforcing credible state 
commitments, while LCIs can focus (at low cost) on the governance functions and 
cooperation problems for which they are best-suited, making their limitations less 
problematic. In short, an institutional ecology composed of both treaty-based institutions and 
complementary LCIs can govern more effectively than either type of institution alone. At the 
same time, however, the layering of LCIs undoubtedly increases the complexity of 
governance, and reduces the focality of incumbent treaty-based institutions. 
 b. Political fit 
Second, an LCI may be a better political fit for a cooperation problem in situation 1, allowing 
states to take on acceptable levels of cost and risk. What is acceptable is itself highly political: 
states seek solutions that protect state sovereignty, allow for freedom of action, and enable 
governments to satisfy constituents’ (changing) demands.  
LCIs impose relatively relaxed constraints on state behavior, because they cannot adopt 
legally-binding rules or strongly enforce them. While these features limit LCIs’ ability to 
address cooperation problems in which incentives to defect are strong, states concerned with 
sovereignty and decisional autonomy often regard them as politically advantageous. By 
creating an LCI, states “can (at least partially) achieve their governance goals while keeping 
[international institutions] relatively weak.”94 For example, in creating the FSB (an IIGO), 
states chose “a level of regulatory stringency that strikes a balance between” shared goals of 
financial stability and national commercial interests.95 Similarly, the EU has sponsored 
numerous TGNs to achieve governance benefits without creating new supranational 
authorities.96  
We do not, however, argue that these considerations systematically trump effective 
cooperation: states seek both substantive and political fit, and conflicts between these goals 
are less intense with LCIs than with treaty-based institutions. The extent to which states 
prioritize substantive or political fit depends on the circumstances, especially the salience of 
costs and risks.  
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Material costs are salient where states face significant budget constraints. Political costs, such 
as sovereignty and exit costs, are salient where issues are highly sensitive, domestically or 
internationally, and potential losses are substantial, as in security and economics. Risks are 
salient during processes of institutional CREATION or CHANGE, when the outcome of 
negotiations, the institution’s effectiveness and the constraints it may impose are all uncertain. 
Risks are likewise salient in other situations of uncertainty: e.g., where a state’s own current 
and future preferences and those of others are difficult to determine; and where the nature of 
problems and the impacts of potential solutions are not fully understood. Where costs and 
risks are highly salient, states may prioritize political fit to the extent of choosing or creating 
institutions that lack the capacity to achieve their stated mandates, even “empty” 
institutions.97  
LCIs can ameliorate gridlock by facilitating compromise. Introducing flexible LCIs as 
elements of negotiation can – perhaps at some sacrifice of strong commitments – help bridge 
differences in national preferences, circumstances and capacities. LCIs can also bridge 
differences between weak and strong states. Powerful states are particularly concerned with 
delegating strong powers to treaty-based institutions, because they fear unanticipated 
sovereignty costs. Thus, establishing LCIs with little ability to create such costs may 
encourage powerful states to accept otherwise stronger substantive rules, thereby inducing 
weaker states to participate as well.98  
Finally, LCIs may facilitate cooperation when political opportunity structures are malign.99 
When opportunity structures are benign – characterized by trust and diffuse reciprocity100 – 
states can create treaty-based institutions or LCIs based on substantive fit, with little concern 
for sovereignty costs, constraints and exit. When opportunity structures are malign, however – 
where trust has broken down, interstate relations are polarized or hostile, and states resort to 
specific reciprocity – cooperation through treaty-based institutions may be difficult or 
impossible.  
Under these conditions, LCIs offer two distinct pathways to modest cooperation. First, even 
where relations among national leaders are polarized, those leaders may accept the need for 
continued international cooperation in limited areas, e.g., technical cooperation on cross-
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border interactions. LCIs are well-suited to advance such cooperation, and to do so with 
limited publicity, minimizing leaders’ audience costs with supporters. 
Second, where polarization and distrust are concentrated at the level of national leaders, 
lower-level officials, as well as non-state actors, may retain more cooperative preferences; 
they can advance these preferences through LCIs to the extent they have sufficient political 
space for independent action.  
Both pathways depend on the fact that cooperation through LCIs often flies “under the radar;” 
the general public is simply unaware of many IIGOs, TGNs and TPPPs. The features that 
reduce domestic approval costs are partly responsible, as is the technical nature of many LCI 
activities. While reduced visibility raises legitimacy concerns, in malign political opportunity 
structures it holds out hope for modest levels of socially beneficial cooperation. To be sure, 
the second mechanism presupposes that leaders do not prevent lower-level officials from 
participating in LCIs. Yet LCIs are not invisible; capable leaders committed to stamping out 
cooperation can identify and block their actions. Thus, this mechanism is more likely to 
operate where leaders’ antagonism reflects political strategies rather than sincere beliefs, and 
where leaders lack the resources or competence to police all forms of governance.  
LCIs are also used by sub-groups of states that seek outcomes others may oppose. For 
example, states that support a particular level of cooperation can create a new LCI to (at least 
partially) bypass defenders of the status quo – or those lacking the political will for enhanced 
cooperation – in an incumbent treaty-based institution, a common strategy for actors facing 
“legislative gridlock.”101 LCIs are well-suited to this strategy because they lack strong norms 
of multilateralism, allowing states to exclude “spoilers” but include like-minded actors.102 
LCIs are thus often used to organize “coalitions of the willing” within larger groups of states, 
as both PSI and the Australia Group were. Similarly, states may use an LCI to bypass 
opponents of the status quo, who might otherwise force unwelcome change in an incumbent 
institution. The US did so in relinquishing control over the Internet Corporation for 
Assignment of Names and Numbers (ICANN), making it an independent private body.103  
From this analytical reasoning, we can derive the following theoretical conjecture:  
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Following an inter-state dispute on an emerging cooperation problem in an incumbent 
treaty-based institution, we should observe states that favor a particular level of 
cooperation creating an LCI with more limited membership to address the problem. 
At the extreme, a sub-group of states – e.g., powerful states – may shift issues to an LCI 
purely to obtain superior distributive outcomes, or to reinforce their power, vis-à-vis other 
states.104 To the extent LCI creation reflects such motives, our analysis of the benefits of 
layering LCIs over incumbent institutions may change. 
Situation (2)  
Moving to the right in Figure 2, states can layer a new LCI over an incumbent treaty-based 
institution as a low-cost form of CHANGE. For reasons summarized above, treaty-based 
institutions are often difficult to change; they may be unable to “update” their initially agreed 
rules.105 Layering a new LCI over an incumbent institution can “accommodate and in many 
ways adapt to the logic of the preexisting system,” but it can also change “the ways in which 
the original rules structure behavior.”106 Among other things, a complementary LCI can add 
new governance functions, modes of operation and participants, without interfering with the 
activities of the incumbent institution. In the EU, for example, member states sponsored the 
Focal Point Network on food safety (a TGN), even though food safety was already governed 
by a formal EU agency. Their intention was to add expertise to the regime without increasing 
the incumbent institution’s authority.107  
Adding a malleable LCI may offer more nuanced governance options than CHANGE in the 
incumbent institution. For example, the UK, with other governments and private partners, 
launched the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) in 2002. By 
layering this TPPP over the International Energy Agency and Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, these actors emphasized particular energy issues (including scalable 
efficiency projects, capacity building and challenging legal barriers); rendered those regimes 
more effective; and introduced new modes of governance, including working with sub-state 
and non-state actors, small-scale operational projects, local management, private finance and 
experimentation – all with low formation and operating costs and the legitimacy of 
stakeholder engagement.108  
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To be sure, states cannot accomplish every kind of CHANGE in this way. It is difficult, for 
example, to restrict a treaty-based institution’s authority or modify its decision procedures. 
But layering LCIs over incumbent institutions may allow participating actors to bypass 
existing procedures for particular issues, and can accomplish many other kinds of change. 
CREATING an LCI often involves lower costs than CHANGING a treaty-based institution: 
transaction costs and domestic approval costs are lower; uncertainty over the outcome of 
negotiations and the effects of institutional change are reduced, as the existing institution 
continues in its current form; and the LCI poses limited sovereignty costs. 
Situation (3)  
Finally, toward the right of Figure 2, boundedly rational states may sequentially consider the 
options to USE, SELECT and CHANGE an incumbent institution, but determine that none of 
those options is satisfactory. At that point, CREATING an LCI may be more attractive than 
CREATING a new treaty-based institution: formation and operating costs are lower; an LCI 
creates fewer sovereignty costs; change and exit costs are also lower, reducing risk. In 
addition, the LCI will neither change nor replace any incumbent institution. Depending on the 
nature of the cooperation problem, the LCI may offer sufficient governance capabilities to 
meet states’ aspiration level, especially considering costs. Even more frequently, CREATING 
an LCI will be more attractive than the only other alternatives: leaving a cooperation problem 
unaddressed or entrusting it to an institution already found to be unsatisfactory.  
2. Non-state proponents 
The unitary state assumption is a valuable simplification for many purposes, such as 
explaining state choices between treaty-based institutions and IIGOs or hard and soft law.109 
In fact, however, executive, bureaucratic and societal actors almost always act as proponents 
and supporters (or opponents) of transnational cooperation, attempting to persuade states to 
act in certain ways. We assume that these actors, like states, are motivated both by substantive 
concerns and by their own organizational interests. Considering their actions brings the 
domestic politics of institutional choice center stage along with its costs and benefits.  
Consider TGNs. In a world with only treaty-based institutions, a government agency 
concerned with a problem in its domain might see a need for transnational cooperation. Yet its 
only option would be to persuade “the state” – in the person of the national leader, ministers 
or high executive officials, and often the legislature – to take up that problem and negotiate 
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with other states: to USE, SELECT or CHANGE an incumbent treaty-based institution or 
CREATE a new one.  
The agency would be concerned with domestic approval costs, and with its own role in the 
collective response – e.g., its position on the national delegation – as well as the effectiveness 
of that response. Transaction costs, sovereignty costs and uncertainty would be relevant 
because they influence the state’s willingness to address the problem, as well as its 
negotiations. But the agency would have a relatively small stake in the precise form of the 
institution. 
Yet the world no longer includes only treaty-based institutions. As the New Interdependence 
Approach (NIA) suggests, and the examples provided above confirm, globalization has 
created “new political channels […] to forge alliances across countries and across levels of 
transnational and international actors.” As a result, executive, bureaucratic and societal actors 
increasingly participate in transnational institutions – what we call LCIs – to achieve their 
goals.110  
Once LCIs are available, the agency’s opportunities and incentives change. It now has a 
strong organizational incentive to favor a particular type of institution, a TGN, which will 
give it a direct role in global governance, often with limited oversight by ministerial or 
legislative officials. Participating in a TGN such as IOSCO “helps independent regulators 
minimize [domestic] political interference in their affairs while building up their reputation 
and authority.”111 The TGN thus empowers the agency as well as addressing the substantive 
problem; this effect may be of limited concern to the state, but it is a central interest of the 
agency.  
The agency therefore has an incentive to persuade the state to sponsor a TGN, rather than to 
USE, SELECT or CHANGE an existing treaty-based institution, even if that institution is 
reasonably effective, or to CREATE a new one. TGNs’ low domestic approval costs facilitate 
the agency’s efforts, while their low transaction and sovereignty costs are important selling 
points in its efforts at persuasion.112  
Similar incentives apply to private actors and TPPPs. In a world with only treaty-based 
institutions, NGOs, business groups and other private proponents of transnational cooperation 
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could only lobby states to take up an issue and negotiate an inter-state solution. Where LCIs 
are available, though, private proponents can persuade states to join them in CREATING a 
TPPP, rather than (or in addition to) USING, SELECTING, CHANGING or CREATING a 
treaty-based institution. As a TPPP will empower them through direct participation, private 
actors have a strong incentive to press for this option. For example, NGOs supported the 
creation of the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (a TPPP) as it enabled them to 
participate in debate and form coalitions.113 Again, low domestic approval costs make the 
proponents’ work easier, while low transaction and sovereignty costs are important selling 
points.  
Our analytical reasoning leads us to the following theoretical conjecture:  
When a new cooperation problem emerges, we should observe bureaucratic officials 
and non-state actors taking political action to persuade governments to create or 
sponsor a TGN or a TPPP, respectively – rather than addressing the problem within an 
incumbent treaty-based institution. 
The influence domestic agencies and private actors have on states’ institutional choices varies 
across states, proponents and issues. However, these actors have important sources of 
persuasive power that are relevant across issue areas. For example, states rely on specialized 
agencies because of their expertise and their ability to address technical problems within their 
domains.114 Agencies frequently interact with counterparts abroad, so their assessments of 
potential cooperation are likely to be influential.115 In addition, by proposing the creation of a 
TGN, agencies offer to take responsibility for a problem; other governmental bodies, with 
limited resources, will often be pleased to take up their offer. Private actors have similar, if 
somewhat weaker, persuasive advantages. Most importantly, however, the availability of 
LCIs gives these actors a strong incentive to favor those institutional forms, changing the 
domestic politics of institutional choice.  
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V. Implications  
We conclude by suggesting several implications of our analysis for global governance. 
1. Status quo bias, gridlock and polarization 
Our analysis suggests that the availability of LCIs as institutional options reduces the 
institutional status quo bias of global governance, making decisions to CREATE (LCIs) more 
likely than JMS suggests. The figures on institutional proliferation presented at the outset 
support this suggestion.  
LCIs offer pathways for states to at least partially overcome the dysfunctional procedures and 
gridlock that currently characterize many treaty-based institutions.116 They allow states to 
bypass burdensome decision procedures, and to increase support for cooperation by fine-
tuning governance arrangements to specific problem characteristics, contextual features and 
political sensitivities. In addition, states seeking collective action can avoid veto players by 
shifting issues to LCIs.   
LCIs facilitate compromise among states with different circumstances, preferences and 
power. Introducing a range of institutions into negotiations creates additional bases for 
agreement; LCIs’ malleability and flexibility allow them to bridge differences; and their 
limited legal authority induces powerful states to participate. 
Finally, where political opportunity structures for transnational cooperation are malign – as in 
the current period of polarization and tension – LCIs provide opportunities for modest forms 
of cooperation. National leaders can use LCIs for technical cooperation, and lower-level 
officials can use them to advance cooperative preferences; LCIs’ limited visibility helps them 
to avoid politically fraught intervention. These avenues raise thorny normative issues: they 
can reduce transparency and accountability, favor powerful actors, and produce relatively 
weak collective action. In positive terms, however, they may well enhance or protect 
cooperation.  
2. Institutional composition  
Implicit in JMS’ diagnosis of a strong institutional status quo bias is the assumption that the 
types of institutions that have dominated international governance – treaty-based institutions – 
will remain dominant. Our analysis, in contrast, suggests that the availability of LCIs will 
continue to change the composition of global governance institutions over time to include an 
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expanding proportion of IIGOs, TGNs, TPPPs and other institutional forms. Again, the 
proliferation of these forms over the past two decades provides strong empirical support. 
 3. Expanding governance options 
LCIs are highly malleable, providing states (and other actors) an expanded palette of 
governance options. They are also highly flexible, so that states can modify them at low cost 
as circumstances change. LCIs thus allow states to fine-tune governance arrangements to the 
substantive and political characteristics of particular problems, and to modify them as 
problems or demands for governance evolve, or as current arrangements prove unsatisfactory. 
Layering further broadens the palette. Over time, the emergence and differentiation of LCIs 
should facilitate more nuanced global governance.117 
4. Institutional complementarity  
Contemporary global governance is highly institutionalized, with established treaty-based 
organizations in virtually all issue areas (JMS:19) and a growing number of LCIs. If only by 
default, then, decisions to CREATE LCIs generally involve adding new institutions to 
incumbent ones, rendering governance “highly layered.” 118 LCIs are frequently intended to, 
and do in practice, complement incumbent treaty-based institutions.  
Complementary LCIs can address cooperation problems, and specific aspects of cooperation 
problems, for which they are well-suited – such as those involving coordination, information, 
trust-building, non-state actors and experimentation – while leaving to treaty-based 
institutions those aspects for which LCIs are poorly-suited – credible commitments and 
enforcement. In addition, LCIs allow states to bypass procedural and political blockages in 
treaty-based institutions, and can act as low-cost change agents.   
At the same time, LCIs are in some sense competitors to treaty-based institutions. While 
direct competition is rarely intense, LCIs do provide alternatives to incumbent treaty-based 
institutions for states choosing governance arrangements. Where states prefer LCIs, their 
choices reduce the focality of incumbent institutions, individually and as a class, potentially 
weakening the scope of their authority. Such choices also increase governance complexity, 
which may have negative as well as positive consequences. Finally, states may choose LCIs 
for political reasons – e.g., to reduce constraints or to signal action without taking costly steps 
– where incumbent treaty-based institutions would govern more effectively.  
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In the aggregate, however, the proliferation of LCIs produces a more diverse and variegated 
global governance system. This should have several positive effects: providing alternatives to 
dysfunctional institutions, making governance more nuanced and flexible, and generating 
beneficial divisions of labor.119 In addition, collaboration between treaty-based institutions 
and LCIs can enhance governance while strengthening both parties.120  
5. Empowering infra- and non-state actors  
LCIs empower their executive, bureaucratic and societal participants. This empowerment is 
changing the patterns of authority in global governance and its actor composition, in parallel 
to ongoing changes in institutional composition. Given their rapid proliferation, LCIs appear 
to have been more responsible for these changes in authority than state delegation to non-state 
actors, and as responsible as entrepreneurial activities by non-state actors.121 Because 
empowerment incentivizes infra- and non-state actors to promote LCIs, we expect governance 
authority to continue to diversify.   
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